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Moreover, the United States Supreme Court, in Anders v.
California,1977 noted that the duty of counsel "requires that he
support his clienti] ... to the best of his ability."1 978 However,
the Supreme Court also stated that "[f]or judges to second guess
reasonable professional judgments and impose on appointed
counsel a duty to raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a
client would disserve the very goal of vigorous and effective
advocacy that underlies Anders." 1979
In comparing the state and federal standards, it appears that
waiver of counsel is easier under a federal standard than the state
standard. New York state will first make a determination as to
whether the decision to appear pro se is frivolous or not before
allowing a waiver of the constitutional right to be represented by
counsel.

CRIMINAL TERM
KINGS COUNTY
1 980
People v. Richardson
(decided September 20, 1993)

The criminal defendant, an indigent, requested the court to
appoint counsel, on a motion to vacate a judgment. 1981 The court
accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event

that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary." Id. at 835
n.46 (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-26 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).

1976. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 187 n.17 (1984).
1977. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

1978. Id. at 744.
1979. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983).
1980. 159 Misc. 2d 167, 603 N.Y.S.2d 700 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993).
1981. Id. at 167, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 701; see also N.Y. CRIN. PROC. LAw

§440.10 (McKinney 1993). The statute provides in relevant part:
1. At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which it
was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate such
judgment upon the ground that:

(a) The court did not have jurisdiction of the action or of the
person of the defendant; or
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held that the defendant had neither a Federal 1 982 nor a state1 983

constitutional right to court appointed counsel on a postconviction motion. 1984
On June 22, 1987, the defendant, Carolyn Richardson, pled
guilty to four counts of murder in the second degree. 19 8 5 At this
(b)

The judgment was procured by duress, misrepresentation or
fraud on the part of the court or a prosecutor or a person
acting for or in behalf of a court or a prosecutor; or
(c) Material evidence adduced at a trial resulting in the judgment
was false and was, prior to the entry of the judgment, known
by the prosecutor or by the court to be false; or
(d) Material evidence adduced by the people at a trial resulting in
the judgment was procured in violation of the defendant's
rights under the constitution of this state or of the United
States; or
(e) During the proceedings resulting in the judgment, the
defendant, by reason of mental disease or defect, was
incapable of understanding or participating in such
proceedings; or
(f) Improper and prejudicial conduct not appearing in the record
occurred during a trial resulting in the judgment which
conduct, if it had appeared in the record, would have
required a reversal of the judgment upon an appeal
therefrom; or
(g) New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a
judgment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which
could not have been produced by the defendant at the trial
even with due diligence on his part and which is of such
character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based
upon such ground must be made with due diligence after the
discovery of such alleged new evidence; or
(h) The judgment was obtained in violation of a right of the
defendant under the constitution of this state or of the United
States.

Id.
1982. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
.shall... have the assistance of counsel for his defense.").
1983. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. ("In any trial in any court whatever the party
accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel .
1 M").
1984. Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 170, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
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time, the defendant clearly informed the court that she had
discussed her guilty plea with her attorney and understood the
consequences of such a plea. 19 86 Richardson also indicated that
she had been advised of her rights and was satisfied with her
counsel. 1987 Moreover, the defendant responded in the
affirmative when asked whether she pled guilty because she was
truly guilty and whether her plea was entered of her own free
will. 19 8 8 Six years later, the defendant made a motion to have the
court vacate this judgment and requested a court appointed
attorney to aid her in this task. 1989
The court began its analysis of defendant's claim by reiterating
that the United States Constitution requires states to provide
counsel at trial for indigent defendants. 19 90 This right extends to
an indigents' first appeal as of right as well, 199 1 but does not
extend to discretionary appeals nor does it extend past the initial
appeal. 1992 In addition, the right to counsel has been held not to
extend to indigent defendants in collateral proceedings. 1993
However, "[w]hile the Federal Constitution does not mandate
appointment of counsel to indigents, States are free to interpret
their own constitutional provisions differently." 1994
Prior to this decision, New York had not yet addressed the
issue of whether its State Constitution provided an indigent
defendant with the right to counsel in a post-conviction motion to

1985. See N.Y. L.J., October 4, 1993, at 26.
1986. Id.
1987. Id.
1988. Id. at 27.
1989. Id.
1990. Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 701; see also U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.
1991. See Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 701; see also
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 358, 357-58 (1963).

1992. See Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 701; see also
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974) (refusing to extend Sixth
Amendment right to counsel after the initial appeal or to discretionary
appeals).

1993. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987).
1994. Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 168, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
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vacate a judgment. 1995 The court stated that in deciding whether
state constitutional rights differs from the federal constitutional

rights, the courts should look to "'interpretive'
interpretive'

factors"

and 'non-

surrounding the case. 19 96 Interpretive

factors include "'differences in the text, structure, or historical
underpinning' of the State and Federal Constitutions.

' 1997

Non-

interpretive factors include, in part, "whether the right is of local
concern," balanced against practical considerations and the need
for uniformity. 1998
Turning to interpretive factors, the court utilized a textual
analysis of the New York State Constitution. 1999 The word
"trial" had to be interpreted in this context and for this particular
righft. 2000 The court held that the word "trial" does not include

post-judgment motions. Rather, a trial terminates when a verdict
is delivered. 20 01 The court further determined that a judgment is
entered upon sentencing. 2002 Consequently, the court held that
2003
the word trial would not include post-judgment motions.
The court noted that historically, New York had not granted
defendants the right to counsel in post-conviction matters.2004

Further, any such right that has been granted had its "genesis" in
1995. Id. at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
1996. Id. (quoting People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d
556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1091
(1987)).
1997. Id. at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 702. (quoting People v. Alvarez, 70
N.Y.2d 375, 378, 515 N.E.2d 898, 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212, 213 (1987)).
1998. Id. at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
1999. Id.
2000. Id. (citing People v. Anderson, 16 N.Y.2d 282, 288, 213 N.E.2d 445,
448, 266 N.Y.S.2d 110, 114 (1965)).
2001. Id. at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 703; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 1.20(11) (McKinney 1993) ("[A] jury trial commences with the selection of
the jury and includes all further proceedings through the rendition of a
verdict. .. ").

2002. Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 703; see also N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(15) (McKinney 1993) ("A judgment is comprised of
a conviction and the sentence imposed thereon and is completed by imposition
and entry of the sentence.")
2003. Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
2004. Id.
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the Federal Constitution. 2005 Hence, since the court found no

actual or historical right to counsel in post-judgment motions
within the New York Constitution, nor any financial reason to
create one, it concluded that there was no mandate to provide
2006
indigent defendants with counsel in such situations.
Based on its failure to find a federal or state constitutional
mandate and the fact that the defendant's case was not a "proper"
matter in which the court could exercise its power to appoint
counsel, the court denied petitioner's request for appointed
counsel.

2005. Id.
2006. Id. Although the court found no constitutional right to counsel in this
case, it went on to analyze several New York statutes. Id. See also N.Y.
Cam. PRoc. LAw § 210.15 (McKinney 1993). This section states in relevant
part:

[t]he defendant has a right to the aid of counsel at the arraignment and
at every subsequent stage of the action, and, if he appears upon such
arraignment without counsel, has the following rights:... To have
counsel assigned by the court in any case where he is financially unable
to obtain the same.
Id. However, the court reached the conclusion that a criminal action terminates
with sentencing and consequently, anything following is not a "stage of the
action." Richardson, 159 Misc. 2d at 169, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 703. See N.Y.
1993)
("A criminal
(McKinney
LAw
§ 1.20
PROC.
CRIM.
action... terminates with the imposition of sentence or some other final
disposition in a criminal court of the last accusatory instrument filed in the
case.").
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